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Introduction
This paper reports preliminary findings of a qualitativesingle case study that explores the relationshipbetween globalisation and security by focusing on
the strategic aspects of the migration of the chip industry
from Taiwan to China.
From the outset, the wave of contemporary globalisation has
shaped the way we think about security in terms of its
agency and scope. The extension of security threats beyond
the military and the state have motivated some scholars to
call for a broad-based and multidisciplinary agenda for secu-
rity studies, known as the “widener’s approach to securi-
ty.” (2)
Following this approach, my study focuses on the sector-
based security issues arising from the migration of the strate-
gic semiconductor industry across the Taiwan Straits, a
potentially explosive flashpoint in world politics today. Semiconductors,  g lobalisat ionand securi ty
Setting the  Scene
The significance and relevance of the case study lie in the
following aspects: First, the semiconductor industry has
demonstrated its significance to the economy and defence of
the countries involved since its inception in 1947, marked by
the seminal invention of the transistor at the world-renowned
Bell Labs. Following Moore’s Law, the empirical observa-
tion Gordon E. Moore made in 1965 forecasting that the
number of transistors on an integrated circuit (IC) for mini-
mum component cost doubles every 24 months, the growth
of the semiconductor industry over the past few decades has
been largely associated with the ability to steadily shrink the
transistor and increase its speed without increasing cost. (3)
Today, chip components available at the end of the industry
supply chain permeate consumer electronics, personal com-
puters, communications, automobiles, aerospace, and mili-
tary end-uses (see Fig. 1). Global sales of semiconductors
This paper summarises preliminary findings of a contextually rich case study that explores the link between
globalisation and security. Following a broad-based and multidisciplinary widener’s approach, the paper explores the
strategic aspects of the migration of the Taiwanese semiconductor industry to China as part of the globalisation
processes. Based on a triangulation of interviews and secondary data analysed thus far, the paper first explores the
drivers of industry migration and the means by which Taiwanese state regulations are violated by related business
operations. It then contends that these profit-driven activities have triggered multi-layered strategic challenges for
Taiwan and the USA involving technological and defence security. Four inter-linked aspects of the strategic
ramifications are analysed: (1) industrial base concerns; (2) technological risks associated with the dual-use nature
of chip technology and the foreign supply of critical chips; (3) concerns reinforced by mainland Chinese institutional
reforms and perceptions; (4) risks reinforced by the Taiwan factor. The paper concludes by calling for an embrace of
a widener’s approach to the study of security.
1. The author would like to express her deepest gratitude for useful comments and feed-
backs from Prof. Peter Nolan, Dr. Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Dr. Fiorella Allio, Dr. Frank
Muyard, an anonymous reviewer of the article, a member of the American defense
industry who wishes to remain anonymous, as well as colleagues at the Centre of
International Studies, University of Cambridge.
2. “Wideners” intend to broaden the security agenda by claiming security status for issues
and referent objects in the economic, technological, societal, political, and environmen-
tal sectors. See, for example, Ann J. Tickner, “Re-Visioning Security,“ in Steve Smith
(ed.), International Relations Theory Today, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995, pp. 175-97;
Barry Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London, Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1998; Joseph S. Nye and S. Lynn-Jones, “International Security Studies: A
Report of a Conference on the State of the Field,“ International Security, vol. 12, n° 4,
Spring 1988, pp. 5-27.
3. Moore’s original statement can be found in Gordon E. Moore, “Cramming More
Components onto Integrated Circuits,” Electronics Magazine, 19 April 1965, pp. 114-
117. A reprint of the article is published in Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 86, n° 1, January
1998, pp. 82-85.
4. Semiconductor Industry Association, “Global Chip Sales Hit Record $247.7 Billion in
2006,” press release, 2 February 2007. See http://www.sia-
online.org/pre_release.cfm?ID=426, accessed 9 March 2007.   
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reached US$247.7 billion in 2006, with sales growth large-
ly driven by popular consumer products such as MP3 play-
ers and cell phones. (4) Its significance to the United States
economy and national security, for instance, was grasped in
a report by the US National Advisory Committee on
Semiconductors in 1989. The report contends: 
The semiconductor industry is strategic to America.
The industry is the foundation of the information age,
playing a crucial role in the consumer electronics
industry, and other industries that have a high elec-
tronic content in their products. America’s national
security also depends on the semiconductor industry.
United States and NATO forces rely on the techno-
logical advantage of advanced semiconductors to offset
the numerical superiority of potential adversaries. (5)
Second, the very existence of various related regulatory
regimes at the multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral level involv-
ing the three major state actors further bespeaks the strategic
nature of the semiconductor industry. At the multilateral level,
the Wassenaar Arrangement, established in 1996, includes
semiconductor items, equipment, materials, and technology
on its Control Lists. As updated at its December 2005
Plenary meeting, Wassenaar identifies its criteria for the
selection of dual-use items as follows: “Dual-use goods and
technologies to be controlled are those which are major or key
elements for the indigenous development, production, use or
enhancement of military capabilities.” As such, current
Wassenaar regulations stipulate that lithography equipment
capable of “producing a pattern with a minimum resolvable
feature size of 180nm or less” is controlled, and intended
export to China requires permission from pertinent
Wassenaar member states. (6) In 2005, the US gave the green
light to the sale of 65nm process technology to Semiconductor
Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC, zhongxin)
in Shanghai, as SMIC CEO Richard Chang (Chang Ju-
ching) announced at the Third China International Industry
Exhibition in Beijing on 24 August 2005.
Figure 1. Basic Stages of the Semiconductor Industry Supply Chain
5. For a brief history of the invention of the transistor, see R. Warner, “Microelectronics: Its
Unusual Origin and Personality,“ IEEE Transactions on Electron Devices, vol. 48, n° 11,
2001, pp. 2457-2467. The quote cited appeared in Robert Kuttner, The End of Laissez-
Faire: National Purpose and the Global Economy after the Cold War, New York, Alfred A.
Knopf, 1991, p. 223.
6. Wassenaar’s function has been arguably marred by the lack of a “no undercut” rule and
other factors. Under a “no undercut” rule, a Wassenaar member would agree not to per-
mit the export of any listed item(s) that have been officially denied an export license by
another member within a specific period. For Wassenaar’s Control Lists updated in
December 2005, consult the following link: http://www.wassenaar.org/controllists/WA-
LIST%20(05)%201%20Corr..pdf. Accessed 15 March 2006. For the lists updated in
December 2006, consult the following link: http://www.wassenaar.org/controllists/WA-
LIST%20(06)%201%20PDF%20Version.pdf. Accessed 15 January 2007.
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At the bilateral level, a pact between Washington and
Beijing in 1998 paved the way for US official end-use vis-
its in China, consisting of pre-license checks and post-
shipment verifications that often involve US official
inspections of China-based semiconductor firms and agen-
cies on the ground. In April 2004, the two governments
exchanged letters vowing to strengthen arrangements for
such visits. For Taiwan, a memorandum of understanding
was sealed with the US on export controls in 1990. In
March 2005, US officials held their first educational
workshop on export controls for Taiwanese counterparts in
Taipei. 
At the unilateral level, the US Department of Commerce
is the authority for administering and enforcing export con-
trols of dual-use items, including advanced semiconductor
components, equipment, materials, related software, and
technology that fall into various sub-categories under
Category Three of the Commerce Control List (CCL). As
for Taiwan, the government ended a total ban on semicon-
ductor investments in China in 2002, allowing China-bound
investments to establish a limited number of 8-inch wafer
fabs using 0.25 micron process technology. On 29
December 2006, the government further lifted restrictions
on China-bound investments in establishing 8-inch wafer
fabs using 0.18 micron process technology. According to
current Taiwanese regulations, Taiwanese firms are forbid-
den to conduct IC design R&D work, to invest in 12-inch
wafer fabs, or to invest in high-end packaging and testing
operations in China. (7)
Thirdly and finally, the Taiwanese chip industry’s migration
to China, as part of the continuous globalisation of the
industry, has unfolded against the backdrop of tense securi-
ty relations across the Taiwan Straits, uneasy Sino-US secu-
rity ties, and the sensitive US-PRC-Taiwan co-existence.
While the US and Taiwan maintain what some US schol-
ars, such as Johnston, dub as a “quasi military” alliance
relationship, the geopolitical links between the US and
China are far from those of allies, partly due to the widely
perceived role of the US as a guarantor of Taiwan’s securi-
ty. (8) The unresolved sovereignty dispute between China
and Taiwan further complicates the geopolitical interactions
among the three actors. Given the strategic nature of the
industry and the tense US-PRC-Taiwan security links, it is
important to analyse the extent to which the sectoral glob-
alisation across the Straits might affect these triangular
security relations.
It should be noted that the chip industry’s strategic nature
has ensured its unique position in the discussion of econom-
ics, security, and international relations, not merely in the
current and ongoing context of the chip sector dynamics
involving the US, PRC, and Taiwan. Similar studies of the
interplay between the chip industry, economics, and securi-
ty have also been conducted in other contexts, such as the
USSR-US confrontation during the Cold War, and Japan’s
ascendancy in the global chip race during the late 1980s and
the early 1990s. (9)
Some definit ions:  Global isation andsecuri ty
Before proceeding to empirical data on the case study in
question, it is important to defined globalisation and securi-
ty, as used here. 
Many academics have described globalisation as contro-
versial, vague, slippery, or ill-defined. (10) Among a prolif-
eration of definitions of globalisation, one strand focuses
on economic globalisation and the other on non-econom-
ic globalisation. In this paper, globalisation is defined
broadly to encompass both economic and non-economic
elements, and as such sees globalisation processes as
multi-dimensional phenomena with multiple causes and
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7. Decisions by the US Commerce Department whether or not to grant licenses are deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis, and the department refers certain applications for inter-
agency reviews and recommendations that may involve the Department of State, the
Pentagon, and the Department of Energy. In Taiwan’s case, the Ministry of Economic
Affairs is in charge of the semiconductor equipment export controls as part of the exist-
ing high-tech trade controls mechanism. The National Science Council is the authority
for talent and technology export controls. Taiwan trade officials interviewed say Taiwan
vows to follow the Wassenaar Arrangement based on the Washington-Taipei pact,
although it is not a member of the multilateral pact. See interviews with Taiwan trade
officials and US trade and defense officials in 2005, government websites and related
government press releases; for example, the US Department of Commerce website at
http://www.bis.doc.gov; “Statement on the Policy of Easing Restrictions on China-bound
Investments in Producing Eight-inch Wafers Using Taiwan’s Wafer Technologies,”
Mainland Affairs Council, Taiwan, 29 December 2006, available at http://www.mac.
gov.tw/english/macpolicy/easing.htm. accessed 15 January 2007.
8. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security, vol. 27, n°
4, 2002, pp. 5-56.
9. On the USSR-US case, see, for example, Beverly Crawford, Economic Vulnerability in
International Relations: The Case of East-West Trade, Investment, and Finance, New
York, Columbia University Press, 1993; J. Fred Bucy, “Technology Transfer and East-
West Trade: A Reappraisal,“ International Security, vol.5, n° 3, 1980-1981, pp. 132-151.
On the US-Japan case, see John W. Kanz, An Uncertain Shield: U.S. Microelectronics and
Foreign Dependencies in a Globalized Industry, PhD Dissertation, The Claremont
Graduate University, 1991; Daniel I. Okimoto et al., The Semiconductor for Competition
and National Security, Stanford, Northeast Asia-United States Forum on International
Policy, Stanford University, 1987; Theodore H. Moran, “The Globalization of America’s
Defense Industries: Managing the Threat of Foreign Dependence,“ International
Security, vol. 15, n° 1, 1990, pp. 57-99.
10. David Held et al., Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, Stanford,
Stanford University Press, 1999, p.1; Jonathan Perraton, “The Scope and Implications of
Globalisation,” in Jonathan Michie (ed.), The Handbook of Globalisation, Cheltenham,
Edward Elgar, 2003. pp. 37-60; Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in
Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance, 2nd ed.,
Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999, p. 17.
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outcomes. Arguably, it is based upon this conception of
globalisation that some scholars have divided globalisa-
tion into separate dimensions, including the economic
(trade, finance, production), the military, the political,
and the cultural, among others. (11)
This paper primarily focuses on the economic and mili-
tary aspects of globalisation pertinent to the semiconduc-
tor industry. The economic globalisation of the sector
encompasses trade, finance, and production, but the par-
ticular focus of the study in question is on the globalisa-
tion of chip production primarily through cross-border
activities of multinational corporations (MNCs) and con-
current or ensuing flows of technology, calibre, foreign
direct investment (FDI), and other forms of capital. By
borrowing the definition of Held et al., production glob-
alisation refers to “the stretching of corporate activity and
business networks across the world’s major economic
regions.” In its most visible and institutionalised form, it
involves the operations of huge MNCs organising and
managing cross-border business activities through the
ownership of plants, outlets, or subsidiaries in different
countries. (12) It is worth noting that the globalisation of
production spearheaded by MNCs can also drive cross-
border workforce migration, especially of highly skilled
expatriate managers. In this sense, some have argued that
cross-border activities of MNCs have become central to
almost all aspects of globalisation, far beyond mere pro-
duction. (13)
As for military globalisation, Held et al. define it as “the
process (and patterns) of military connectedness that
transcend the world’s major regions as reflected in the
spatio-temporal and organisational features of military
relations, networks and interactions.” Among the three
indicators of military globalisation that Held et al. have
proposed, it is the global arms dynamic, particularly the
trans-nationalisation of the defence industrial base
through which armaments production technologies and
military capabilities are diffused on a global scale, that is
linked to the chip industry, given the assumption that the
sector constitutes part of a nation’s defence industrial
base. (14)
As for security, the notion has been a focal point of con-
tention among security studies scholars, with some view-
ing it as rather contested and ambiguous. Moreover, the
three major paradigms in international relations,
Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism, have defined
the notion of national security differently. (15) The conven-
tional Realist account of national security focuses on the
protection of territorial integrity and even core values of
states, with military might as the primary, if not only,
source of power and means to ensure national security.
Conventional Liberals remain state-centric, as their
Realist counterparts do, while emphasising the need to
embrace non-military areas of national security. The
state and military centrism of conventional Realism evap-
orates in the Constructivist conception of national secu-
rity, whereby the major unit of analysis, referent objects
of security, and scope of security differ radically. These
disparate accounts of security do not necessarily follow
the paradigmatic divide, however. A relevant example is
that some scholars from all three camps, with varied
motivations, have called for broadening the notion to
encompass non-military elements to a greater or lesser
extent. 
Considering the fluid nature of the concept of security,
this paper subscribes to Buzan’s belief that a precise def-
inition of security should be directed towards specific
case studies. In other words, “attempts at precise defini-
tion are much more suitably directed towards empirical
cases where the particular factors in play can be identi-
fied.” (16) After identifying unique factors at play in the
empirical case study of the semiconductor industry, secu-
rity directed towards the chip sector is defined to include
economic security, technological security, and defence
security. 
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11. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Globalization: What’s New? What’s Not? (And So
What?),“ Foreign Policy, n° 118, 2000, pp. 16-17; D. Held et al., Global Transformations:
Politics, Economics and Culture, op. cit. Other dimensions of globalisation include social
globalisation, migration of people, environmental globalisation, and technological glob-
alisation.
12. MNCs also outsource production to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) abroad, thus
resulting in the creation of global production networks, in which the chief task for MNCs
does not involve ownership but rather regularised contractual relationships. D. Held et
al., Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, op. cit., pp. 236-237.
13. John Salt, International Movements of the Highly Skilled, Paris, Directorate for
Education, Employment, Labour and Social Affairs, International Migration Unit,
OECD/GD, 1997, pp. 9-10 and pp. 16-18; Grazia Ietto-Gillies, “The Role of Transnational
Corporations in the Globalisation Process,“ in J. Michie (ed), The Handbook of
Globalisation, op. cit., pp. 140-144.
14. D. Held et al., Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, op. cit., p. 89.
15. Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol,“ Political Science
Quarterly, vol. 67, n° 4, 1952, pp. 481-502; Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton
(eds.), Rethinking America’s Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order, New York,
W.W. Norton & Company, 1992; Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Changing Relationship between
Economics and National Security,“ Political Science Quarterly, vol. 106, n° 2, 1991, pp.
265-76; Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security
Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Hemel Hempstead, Harvester, 1991, p. 7; David A.
Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies, n° 23, 1997, pp.
10-12; Steve Smith, “The Concept of Security in a Globalizing World,, in Robert G.
Patman (ed.), Globalization and Conflict: National Security in a ‘New’ Strategic Era,
London and New York, Routledge, 2006, pp. 33-55.
16. B. Buzan, People, States, and Fear, op. cit., p. 20.
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The notion of economic security is defined to include eco-
nomic competitiveness and economic independence, and is
seen as a direct contribution to the exercise of national
power. (17) In concrete terms, since the 1960s, when the US
semiconductor sector became the first to go abroad on a large
scale, the economic security ramifications of the globalisation
of the semiconductor industry have often encompassed fear of
decreased economic competitiveness, job reduction, and “hol-
lowing out” effect, as well as the loss of technology and skilled
personnel. These concerns are certainly not foreign to the cur-
rent Sino-US and China-Taiwan contexts. 
The notion of technological security or techno-security,
according to Simon’s definition, refers to “a concept dealing
with the perception and enhancement of the technological
assets of a nation or a firm,” which arguably presumes that
technology is an important element in national security. (18) In
concrete terms, the absolute and relative decline of a
nation’s semiconductor industry, which is often seen as a key
indicator of a nation’s high-technology development, has
often triggered security concerns.
The notion of defence security refers to the Realist military-
centric and state-centric definition of national security,
whereby the state’s territorial integrity is chiefly maintained
through its military capabilities, and alliances are seen as
“the highest end” in anarchy, the prerequisite for the pursuit
of other goals such as profit, power, and tranquillity, as
Waltz has argued. (19) In concrete terms, the semiconductor
industry links to defence security as it underpins the modern
military clout of a nation by supplying chip components
directly for high-tech military end-uses central to modern bat-
tlefield operations.
The focus of this paper covers aspects of technological and
defence security implications of the Taiwanese chip sector
migration to China, while leaving the theme of economic
security to subsequent writings.
Exi st ing  l iterature  and methodo logy
In regards to existing academic literature on the current and
ongoing context of the chip sector dynamics involving the
US, PRC, and Taiwan, systemic studies of the security ram-
ifications arising from the sectoral migration across the
Straits have been insufficient. Many academic studies have
focused on the economic dimension of the industry migra-
tion or the pertinent policy debates in Taiwan’s domestic
political arena. (20) Few, however, have systematically
analysed the security dimension resulting from the econom-
ic movement. (21)
For example, although the US Defense Science Board
(DSB) in 2005 published an exceptionally relevant task
force report examining potential security risks the US
might face with the continuous shift of US chip manufac-
turing to China, the study remains US-centric. Its refer-
ences to the Taiwan dimension are meagre and even erro-
neous, and it fails to take into account the PRC domestic
policy environment, which is arguably indispensable in
assessing potential security risks for the US. Like many
studies of the economic aspect of the industry migration
across the Straits, the DSB study is also inadequate in that
it is not based on first-hand field research data that might
offer researchers information not readily available in sec-
ondary materials. My study attempts to fill this void in the
existing literature by bridging international political econo-
my and security studies and by engaging in multiple levels
of analysis of the subject matter based on field research
results. 
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17. Borrowing Romm’s conception of economic security, a nation’s economic competitive-
ness refers to the degree to which a nation produces goods and services that meet the
demand of international markets while expanding the real incomes of its citizens; more-
over, the nation’s economic independence equips the nation with the flexibility to make
decisions free from foreign dictates or foreign economic coercion. As for the conception
of economic security as a direct asset to the exercise of national power, it is based upon
Borrus and Zysman’s definition of economic security, which refers to a nation’s “ability
to generate and apply economic resources to the direct exercise of power, or to shape
indirectly the international system and its norms.” Joseph J. Romm, Defining National
Security: the Nonmilitary Aspects, New York, The Council on Foreign Relations, 1993, pp.
78-80; Michael Borrus and John Zysman, “Industrial Competitiveness and American
National Security,” in Wayne Sandholtz et al. (eds.), The Highest Stakes: The Economic
Foundations of the Next Security System, New York, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 9.
18. Denis Fred Simon, “Techno-Security in an Age of Globalization,“ in Denis F. Simon (ed.),
Techno-Security in an Age of Globalization, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1997, pp. 3-21.
19. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading (Mass.), Addison-Wesley,
1979, p. 126.
20. On the economic and domestic politics dimension of the chip migration in the Taiwan-
China context, see, for example, Michael S. Chase et al., Shanghaied? The Economic and
Political Implications of the Flow of Information Technology and Investment across the
Taiwan Straits, Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 2004; T. J. Cheng, “China-Taiwan
Economic Linkage: Between Insulation and Superconductivity,“ in Nancy Bernkopf
Tucker (ed.), Dangerous Straits: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis, New York, Columbia
University Press, 2005, pp. 93-130; Thomas R. Howell et al., China’s Emerging
Semiconductor Industry, San Jose, Semiconductor Industry Association and Dewey
Ballantine LLP, 2003, pp. 67-76; Chyan Yang and Shiu-wan Hung, “Taiwan’s Dilemma
across the Strait,“ Asian Survey, vol. 43, n°4, 2003, pp. 681-696; Barry Naughton, “The
Information Technology Industry and Economic Integrations Between China and
Taiwan,” in Francoise Mengin (ed.), Cyber China: Reshaping National Identities in the
Age of Information, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, pp. 155-84. 
21. On the security aspect of the industry dimension in the US-PRC-Taiwan or Sino-US con-
texts, see, for example, General Accounting Office, Export Controls: Rapid Advances in
China’s Semiconductor Industry Underscore Need for Fundamental U.S. Policy Review,
Washington, D.C., General Accounting Office, 2002; Joseph I. Lieberman, White Paper:
National Security Aspects of the Global Migration of the U.S. Semiconductor Industry,
June 2003, available at: http://www.senate.gov/~lieberman/semi.pdf, accessed on 15
November 2003; Michael Klaus, “Red Chips: Implications of the Semiconductor
Industry’s Relocation to China,“ Asian Affairs: An American Review, vol. 29, n° 4, 2003,
pp.237-253; Defense Science Board Task Force, High Performance Microchip Supply,
Washington, D.C., Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, February 2005.  
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As far as methodology is concerned, the research adopts a
qualitative case study approach supplemented by related
quantitative data. More than 130 interviews with industry
leaders, officials, and experts were conducted chiefly in the
US and Asia, while secondary English-language and
Chinese-language materials were gathered in the US, Asia,
and Europe. In particular, the study involved interviews with
top management executives from seven of the top eight chip
makers in Taiwan and China according to a revenue ranking
in 2004. While accepting the assumption of “partial and
imperfect knowability,” (22) this paper succinctly summarises
preliminary empirical findings based on a triangulation of
interviews and secondary data analysed so far. Migrat ion of  the Taiwanesesemiconductor industry toChina
As the semiconductor industry becomes increasingly global,
China has emerged as its new centre of gravity as IDMs, (23)
IC design houses, foundries, (24) and assembly and testing
companies in North America, Europe, and Asia shift part of
their production operations to China. (25) George Scalise,
President of the Semiconductor Industry Association
(SIA), dubbed the trend “a new outsourcing model” that is
different from the outsourcing activities of the sector over the
past decades and may become a significant factor in the
development of Chinese chip capabilities in due course. In
Scalise’s own words, 
“What is very different about the China outsourcing
is that it is not just assembly and testing... It has
migrated to the front end and towards the leading
edge very quickly. [Consequently], they are now rap-
idly moving toward a design capability, which would
then call for perhaps a fully integrated semiconductor
capability.” (26)
Scope,  speed and  cause  of  the  mig ration
Contributing in part to the semiconductor shift to China is
the wholesale westward movement of the Taiwanese chip
industry. The scope of the industry movement through relo-
cation, technology transfer, investment, and human resource
flow is extensive, and challenges some of the previous beliefs
that Taiwanese input into China’s IC industry is largely con-
fined to the IC manufacturing sub-sector. (27) Instead, the
operation involves almost all of the chief sub-sectors of the
industry supply chain, including IC design, fabrication, and
backend packaging and testing (see Fig. 1).
As far as upstream IC design is concerned, field research
data indicate that some of Taiwan’s top IC design houses
have obtained Taiwanese government permission to estab-
lish offices in China to provide “technical support” to local
customers. However, some of these China-based operations
have illegally engaged in R&D work outsourced from com-
pany headquarters in Taiwan. (28)
First-hand research also shows that IC manufacturing is by
far the most important sub-sector in China’s semiconductor
industry and the one in which Taiwan has its strongest
foothold. “Calibre, capital, and technology from Taiwan
have made tremendous contributions to IC manufacturing
[in China],” observed Taiwanese-born Nasa Tsai (Tsai
Nan-hsiung), former President of Grace Semiconductor
Manufacturing Corporation (GSMC, Hongli), and current-
ly president of Sinomos Semiconductor (Zhongwei). Both
GSMC and Sinomos are China-based foundries associated
with Taiwan. (29)
Interviews with executives from seven of the top eight chip
makers in Taiwan and China have provided additional evi-
dence in support of Tsai’s observation. (30) For instance,
China’s flagship foundry SMIC is led by Taiwanese-
American Richard Chang and houses some 650 employees
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22. Gary King et al., Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research,
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 6-7.
23. IDM refers to integrated device manufacturer, a company that performs every step of
the chip-making process, including design, manufacture, testing, and packaging.
24. A foundry refers to a semiconductor manufacturer that makes chips for third parties.
25. Marco Mora, SMIC Chief Operating Officer, dubbed the trend “geographical shifts” at
SEMICON China, 15 March 2005, Shanghai, China. A recent illustration is Intel’s
announcement in late March 2007 that it would build a 12-inch wafer fab in China using
90nm process technology to produce chipsets for its major microprocessor business.
See, for example, “Intel to Build 300mm Wafer Fabrication Facility in China: Fab 68 in
Dalian is $2.5 Billion Investment,” 26 March 2007, Press Release, available at
http://www.intel.com/pressroom/archive/releases/20070326corp.htm, accessed 26
March 2007; Electronic Engineering Times (Internet Edition), 26 March 2007.
26. Interview, 8 December 2004, San Jose, California.
27. T. Howell et al., China’s Emerging Semiconductor Industry, op. cit., pp. 67-76.
28. Interview with a former Taiwanese IC design house president involved in leading the
company’s operations in China, 20 July 2005, Taipei, Taiwan; interview with a Taiwanese
IC design house chief, 9 September 2005, Beijing, China; interview with a Taiwanese IC
design house vice president, 15 July 2005, Hsinchu, Taiwan.
29. Interviews, 14 September 2005, Ningbo, China.
30. The 2004 ranking is based on the IC Insight data, as cited by Los Angeles Times (Internet
Edition), 3 January 2005. In 2004, top eight chip makers in Taiwan and China included
TSMC, UMC, SMIC, Huahong-NEC, ASMC, CSMC, He Jian, and GSMC. The ranking
changed subsequently with He Jian outperforming many of its challengers on mainland
Chinese soil. According to iSuppli in June 2005, SMIC retained its No.1 position in
China’s foundry market in 2004 with 42 percent of the Chinese market share, followed
by Huahong NEC, He Jian, ASMC, GSMC, and CSMC. In 2005, IC Insights data ranked the
companies as follows: SMIC, Huahong NEC, He Jian, ASMC, Shougang NEC, GSMC, and
CSMC. See Purchasing Magazine (Internet Edition), 18 May 2006.
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from Taiwan. The firm’s Taiwan-born staff account for 59
percent of its total workforce employed from outside
China. (31) Insiders in China’s chip industry pinpointed what
they saw as the pivotal role that Chang has played as a late-
comer into the country. “He is very important. The world
microelectronics industry would look at China with an
absolutely different light but for Richard Chang’s 12-inch
wafer fab,” commented a mainland Chinese veteran engi-
neer with more than 35-year experiences in the country’s
chip industry. (32) Company reports show that SMIC’s sales
revenue figure reached US$1.16 billion in 2005, accounting
for 7 percent of the global foundry market.
In addition, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company
Ltd. (TSMC, Taijidian), headquartered in Hsinchu,
Taiwan, has established a wholly-owned subsidiary in
Shanghai with approval from the Taiwan government. As the
world’s No.1 pure play foundry, TSMC’s sales revenues
reached US$8.22 billion in 2005, accounting for nearly half
of the global foundry market. In 2002, the firm became the
first chip foundry to enter the ranks of the top 10 IC compa-
nies in terms of worldwide sales, claiming the ninth spot. 
In addition, TSMC’s archrival United Microelectronics
Corporation (UMC, Liandian), also headquartered in
Taiwan, has “made use of the grey area” in existing govern-
ment rules to help establish He Jian in Suzhou, China. (33)
As the world’s No.2 pure play foundry, UMC reported sales
revenues totalling US$2.82 billion in 2005, and claimed a
19 percent share of the global foundry market. 
Similarly, GSMC, a pure-play foundry in Shanghai, is also
strongly influenced by the Taiwanese. (34) GSMC currently
houses some 100 Taiwanese employees, and Taiwan-born
staff account for two-thirds of the company’s workforce
employed from outside mainland China. (35) In December
2006, Taiwan’s government approved plans for 8-inch wafer
fab investment in China by the memory chip makers
Powerchip Semiconductor (Lijin) and Promos Technology
(Maode). (36) Finally, some second-tier China-based chip-
makers focusing on 6-inch wafer foundries, such as CSMC
(Huarunshanghua) and Sinomos Semiconductor, are also
run by managers recruited from Taiwan. (37)
As for packaging and testing, research shows that some
Taiwanese packaging and testing firms have undertaken cer-
tain operations in China in violation of regulations at home. (38)
So what has triggered the westward migration of Taiwan’s
chip industry? Perceived market, manpower, and policy
incentives in China appear to be key factors. For example,
a critical player involved in UMC’s establishment of He
Jian (Hejian) said, “We came chiefly because of market
and [manpower] calibre.” (39) The market factor is linked to
China’s insatiable demand for semiconductors due to its
dominance in electronic system production and its fast-
growing end-use markets. According to IC Insight Inc.,
China’s semiconductor market reached US$40.8 billion in
terms of overall consumption in 2005, making it the
world’s largest IC market for the first time, and it is
expected to reach US$124 billion in 2010. (40) F.C. Tseng
(Tseng Fan-cheng), Vice Chairman of TSMC, also point-
ed to market considerations as the key driver behind
TSMC’s establishment of a subsidiary in China: “[We
went there] in order to get our market share in mainland
China’s domestic market.” (41) Likewise, many corporate
executives in the IC design sub-sector identified perceived
market opportunities in China as a driving force in their
move to China. (42)
The availability of local talent in China serves as another
magnet attracting Taiwan’s IC sector westward. In the
UMC-He Jian case, He Jian’s top executive argued that
anticipated shortages of industry-calibre manpower at home
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31. According to the author’s calculation based on data offered by SMIC in September 2005,
86 percent of the firm’s 8,400 employees are from mainland China, whereas the
remaining 14 percent are from outside of the country. Among 1,100 employed from out-
side China, 650 are from Taiwan and 200-250 are from the United States. 
32. Interview with a Chinese industry player associated with one of China’s earliest state-
run semiconductor companies, 17 September 2005, Shanghai, China.
33. Interview with a top executive, He Jian, 21 September 2005, Suzhou, China.
34. GSMC was jointly founded by Winston Wang, son of Taiwan’s top tycoon Wang Yung-
ching, and Jiang Mianheng, son of former Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Vice-
President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS).
35. Interview with the firm’s chairman Zou Shichang, 27 September 2005, Shanghai, China.
36. Press release, Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwan, 27
December 2006. Available at http://www.moeaic.gov.tw, accessed 15 January 2007.
37. Interview with CSMC chairman, 25 September 2005, Shanghai, China; interviews with
Sinomos chairman and president, 14 September 2005, Ningbo, China.
38. Interviews with industry players, September 2005, Shanghai, Suzhou, and Ningbo, China.
39. Interview, 21 September 2005, Suzhou, China.
40. Purchasing Magazine (Internet Edition), 18 May 2006.
41. Interview, 29 June 2005, Hsinchu, Taiwan.
42. See, for instance, interview with a Taiwanese IC design house chief, 9 September 2005,
Beijing, China.
c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
The SMIC factory in Shanghai 
© AFP
Ar t i c l es
Controlling the Uncontrollable
strengthened UMC’s resolve to establish He Jian. (43) Talent
pool considerations have also pushed Taiwan IC design
houses to cross the Straits, especially in the design sub-sec-
tor. As system-on-a-chip (SOC) becomes the dominant
trend, IC design technological complexity is increasing, (44)
and this, in turn, requires a growing number of hardware and
software engineers for the increasingly challenging task of
IC design. Extending operations in China beyond technical
support hubs enables companies to absorb local talent into
entry-level or software work in overall IC design R&D pack-
ages as a means of sharing workload with the firm’s head-
quarters in Taiwan. (45)
Secondary to Taiwan IC firms’ considerations over migrating to
China are policy incentives that the Chinese government has
offered to outside players eyeing a foothold in China. These
incentives include preferential tax treatment and infrastructure
arrangements such as land, water, and electricity supply.
Means  of  v iolating Taiwan’s  state  cont rol s
Certain patterns of behaviour have assisted some Taiwanese
chip firms and individuals in evading government regulations
at home in order to move to China:
(1) The guise of “private” investment: Some industry play-
ers in Taiwan have made “private investment” in
China’s chip industry by either establishing a brand new
semiconductor firm or funnelling funds to China-based
IC design houses. (46) Current regulations in Taiwan,
however, forbid such moves. (47)
(2) IC design R&D work operating behind the veneer of
approved “technical support” functions in China-based
branch offices: The China branches of some Taiwanese
IC design houses have hired local engineers to take part
in aspects of IC design R&D, such as software-related
work, while the company’s core-technology R&D
remains headquartered in Taiwan. (48) As mentioned ear-
lier, “technical support” work by Taiwanese IC design
house offices in China is permitted by the Taiwanese
government, whereas IC design R&D work is not. 
(3) US citizenship helps: Some Taiwanese individuals who
are nationals of both Taiwan and the United States have
emphasised their identities as US citizens while working
in China’s IC industry. Such moves reflect attempts to
evade Taiwanese regulations that might apply to them as
Taiwanese nationals should their involvement in China’s
chip sector be considered illegal by the government in
Taiwan. (49)
(4) Clandestine ownership change: Fieldwork research dis-
covered that in at least one instance, a Taiwanese chip
firm launched operations in China after the government
in Taiwan gave the green light to its application, then
covertly took over ownership of a China-based company
carrying out operations for which it had not yet received
permission. It was only after more than a year that the
Taiwanese firm applied for permission from the
Taiwanese government to acquire the Chinese compa-
ny. (50)
(5) Moving into higher-end production without government
approval: Some Taiwanese chip firms illegally move into
higher-end production at a later stage of their operations
in China, even though the Taiwanese government has
confined its permission to investment in lower-end pro-
duction. 
(6) Firms initially set up in China in contravention of exist-
ing rules continue to develop beyond official constraints:
Current regulations in Taiwan forbid transfers of foundry
process technology to China for feature sizes smaller
than 0.18 micron and investment in 12-inch wafer fabs
in China. However, some foundries in China that were
established with Taiwanese input, especially in terms of
managerial and engineering talent and capital, continue
to circumvent Taiwanese regulations to develop beyond
official restrictions. At least two of them have long been
using process technology for feature sizes smaller than
0.18 micron. One, in particular, offers 0.35 micron to
90nm IC manufacturing services to its customers and
61N o  2 0 0 8 / 1
43. Interview, 21 September 2005, Suzhou, China.
44. An SOC “incorporates at least one processor, memory and any number of other func-
tions, such as protocol converters, signal processors, and input and output controllers.”
See Greg Linden and Deepak Somaya, “Systems-on-a-Chip Integration in the
Semiconductor Industry: Industry Structure and Firm Strategies,“ Industrial and
Corporate Change, vol. 12, n° 3, 2000, pp. 545-576.
45. Interview with a former Taiwanese IC design house president involved in leading the
company operations in China, 20 July 2005, Taipei, Taiwan; interview with a Taiwanese
IC design house president, 27 October 2005, Taipei, Taiwan.
46. Interviews with industry players, August, September, and December 2005, China and the
United Kingdom. 
47. Interview with Huang Chintan, Executive Secretary, Investment Commission, Ministry of
Economic Affairs, 18 August 2005, Taipei, Taiwan.
48. Interview with a Taiwanese IC design house vice president, 15 July 2005, Hsinchu,
Taiwan.
49. Richard Chang’s application to relinquish his Taiwanese citizenship while keeping his US
citizenship is a case in point. Another instance is that two professionals from Taiwan
currently heading one of China’s chip foundries put their nationality as “USA” instead of
Taiwan in the company’s prospectus for the firm’s initial public offering (IPO) in 2004.
One of them, however, still travels to and from Taiwan holding his Taiwanese passport.
Interviews with industry players, September 2005, Shanghai, China.
50. Interviews with various industry players, September 2005, Shanghai, China; related
Taiwanese government press release, 27 December 2006.
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has already operated one 12-inch wafer fab. (51) These
moves clearly go beyond the Taiwanese government’s
artificially imposed ceiling. (52)
To sum up, across the chip industry we can see Taiwanese
chip firms and individuals turning a blind eye to existing reg-
ulations at home that are designed to control semiconductor-
related investment and technology transfer to China. In this
respect, government rules in Taiwan are mere attempts to
“control the uncontrollable” in terms of curtailing the chip
sector’s westward flight driven by a combination of econom-
ic factors. Although Taiwan is far from being the only exter-
nal player that has facilitated the Chinese chip industry’s
catch-up process, first-hand research shows that Taiwanese
input has been pivotal. “Through various forms of ‘interna-
tionalisation,’ calibre and capital from Taiwan have entered
mainland China and played important roles. GSMC,
SMIC, TSMC and He Jian, for example, cannot shake off
their links to Taiwan… [Taiwan’s President] Chen Shui-bian
(Chen Shui-bian) is unable to control the trend. Taiwan has
already exerted its impact here,” said a heavyweight player
in the Chinese chip industry. (53) The question that remains
is to what extent these profit-driven activities across the
Straits might trigger security risks for the countries involved.Security  impli cations o f  thechip  industry migration
The migration of the Taiwanese chip sector to China has
arguably triggered multiple layers of security ramifications for
Taiwan and the United States involving economic, technologi-
cal, and defence security. The analysis here will chiefly focus
on four inter-linked aspects of technological and defence secu-
rity challenges Taiwan and the US face in the wake of China’s
growing chip manufacturing and design capabilities resulting
from external input from the outside, including Taiwan’s.
These challenges include: (1) industrial base concerns; (2)
technology-related risks associated with the dual-use nature of
the semiconductor technology and the issue of foreign supply
of critical chips; (3) concerns reinforced by China’s institution-
al reforms and its perception of the chip’s importance to its
industrial base, military modernisation and modern electronic
warfare; (4) risks reinforced by the Taiwan factor.
Industrial  base  concerns
A strong chip industrial base can potentially enhance a nation’s
defence capabilities, given the semiconductor industry’s posi-
tion as “a building block” (54) in modern weapons, communica-
tions, navigation, space, and battle management systems, all of
which act as force multipliers in modern military affairs.
“The reason why the United States, Europe, and Japan
have advanced defence technologies is because of the back-
ing of the very good industrial bases, part of which depend
upon solid IC industry supply chains,” observed a veteran
industry player. “Following China’s opening-up policy, the
nation’s overall industrial base can become a critical driving
force that helps enhance Chinese defence and aerospace
technologies if its IC industry, along with other system man-
ufacturing industry bases, develop quite well.” (55)
The continued development of China’s chip industrial base
is undoubtedly accelerated by foreign input in the form of
investment, technology, and calibre transfers to China from
Taiwan and elsewhere. These external elements help China
cope with deep-seated structural, organisational, and institu-
tional challenges in establishing a fully-fledged chip industri-
al base. (56) Significant contributions by players from outside,
including Taiwan, are apparent. For instance, staff training
programs in Taiwanese-managed or Taiwanese-owned IC
design houses and foundries in China help nurture China’s
semiconductor talent. Moreover, in the form of the “multi-
project wafer” (MPW) shuttle service, these foundries offer
subsidies to local customers to assist them with their proto-
typing efforts by sharing exorbitantly expensive masks. (57)
These customers include local design houses and research
institutes, such as the influential Chinese Academy of
Sciences (CAS). Foundries in China – which is where
Taiwanese input is most apparent – contribute to the growth
and development of China’s chip industrial base by elevat-
ing IC design development and feeding orders to back-end
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51. Electronic Engineering Times (Internet Edition), 12 May 2006; Economic Daily (Internet
Edition), 7 September 2006; various company websites.
52. One firm in question continuously argues that it should not be under the reign of
Taiwanese regulations because it is a MNC registered outside of Taiwan and based in
China, and the other has long operated in defiance of Taipei’s official rules. The former
company’s efforts to dilute its Taiwan connection seem futile, however, as numerous
interviewees in the field described the firm as a stark example of Taiwanese contribu-
tions to the Chinese chip industrial catch-up.
53. Interview, 30 August 2005, Beijing, China.
54. Interview with Michael R. Polcari, President & CEO of International SEMATECH, 7
January 2005, Austin, Texas.
55. Interview, 9 September 2005, Beijing, China.
56. Market forecasters disagree about the overall outlook of the Chinese chip industry. A
Chinese market analyst, for instance, predicts that half of China’s fab hopefuls will fail
because of the lack of partnerships and manufacturing expertise. See Electronic
Engineering Times (Internet Edition), 10 July 2006.
57. “Mask” refers to the device used to shape desired geometries on the surface of the
wafer.
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packaging and testing operations. (58) Thus, initial external
input, as mentioned earlier, unquestionably serves as a long-
term catalyst for the creation of a competent chip industrial
base in China. 
Once a solid chip industrial base comes into shape in China,
it can potentially act as a major factor in enhancing the
nation’s overall defence technology and capability, as
resources in a strong industrial base invariably spill over into
the military through technological and talent exchanges
between an economy’s civilian and defence sectors. 
For example, cutting-edge firms from the civilian side of the
chip industry can not only provide the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) with commodity-type standard ICs, but can
also help design and manufacture critical chip hardware tai-
lored to the  PLA’s needs. The supply of both advanced
commodity ICs and application-specific integrated circuits
(ASICs) at home, in turn, can overcome the long-standing
risks the PLA has faced from unreliable foreign supplies of
critical chip components. (59) It also helps China mitigate out-
side influences intent on slowing advances in the PLA’s
capabilities, in particular the US-led export controls
designed to curb inflows of militarily-sensitive semiconductor
items, equipment, and materials to China.
Technology -re lated  risk
Aside from industrial base security concerns, the cross-Strait
chip industry migration also entails technology-related risks.
These threats are either reinforced by the dual-use nature of
the semiconductor technology or are linked to the issue of
foreign supply of critical chips to defence, major infrastruc-
ture, and intelligence systems.
As Lewis M. Branscomb et al have argued, most technology
is dual-use or multi-use in nature, (60) and semiconductors are
no exception. For instance, chips that make precise missile
guidance possible can also appear in mobile phones and
automobiles. By the same token, the underlying semiconduc-
tor process technology for manufacturing IC components for
consumer electronics is fundamentally the same as that for
military electronics. (61) So if a nation’s chip industry attains
cutting-edge capabilities to fabricate chips chiefly for non-mil-
itary end-users (such as cell phones, PCs, and automobiles),
a related process technology can arguably be used to make
chips for military applications, depending on the design.
China’s chip industry is in the process of catching up to feed
civilian end-users, domestic and international alike, but the
cutting-edge technology accumulated for these purposes can
potentially serve the needs of the Chinese military. (62)
The technological development trajectory switch from “spin-
off” to “spin-on” adds further complexity to the picture. (63)
Many technologies critical to military power have been grad-
ually discovered in the civilian rather than military markets.
Partly in response to the increasing commercial availability
of high-performance ICs and partly for monetary reasons,
the Perry Initiative of 1994 has changed the US defence
acquisition policy to an emphasis on buying commercial-off-
the-shelf (COTS) components for new system designs. As
a result, the commercial market where high-end chip compo-
nents are available has become a supply dump for the US
defence establishment. (64) The US policy change has spilled
over to other countries such as Taiwan (65) and China, as a
result of which the proportion of COTS insertion in defence
systems on a global scale has increased. “COTS products
replace Mil-Spec parts at a rate of 15 percent per year,”
although COTS are not recommended for radiation military
and aerospace systems, where such insertion can jeopardise
the systems in question. (66) It is highly likely that the defence
sectors in other countries, including China, can and will con-
tinue to seek high-performance IC supplies from the com-
mercial market for monetary and technical reasons whenev-
er possible. If China’s chip industry becomes a viable
Controlling the Uncontrollable
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58. Although the foundry-fabless development model seems to dominate the current chip
industrial landscape in China, partially copying the success story in Taiwan, some favor
the IDM model instead.
59. Several technology journals in China have mentioned the headache of foreign supply of
electronic components faced by the nation’s defence and aerospace sectors.
60. Lewis M. Branscomb et al., Beyond Spinoff: Military and Commercial Technologies in a
Changing World, Boston, Harvard Business School Press, 1992, p. 4.
61. Interview with Michael R. Polcari, President & CEO of International SEMATECH, 7
January 2005, Austin, Texas. 
62. The U.S.-China Security Review Commission, “Technology Transfers and Military
Acquisition Policy,” in Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Security Review
Commission-the National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship between
the United States and China (Internet Edition), Washington D.C., US Government Printing
Office, July 2002. Available at http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000_
2003/reports/ch10_02.htm, accessed 4 May 2004.
63. Military systems use many IC components that must incorporate certain technologies
for which there is no commercial demand. These include technologies required for radi-
ation hardening, high-power microwave, and millimeter-wave circuits and special sen-
sor requirements. See Defense Science Board Task Force, High Performance Microchip
Supply, op. cit., p. 24, quoting Critical Assessment of Technologies, DOD Advisory Group
on Electron Devices, 2002.
64. William J. Perry, Specifications and Standards- A New Way of Doing Business, Memo,
Department of Defense, 24 June 1994. The Perry Initiative advocated greater reliance
on COTS items from commercial marketplace and greater use of performance and com-
mercial specifications and standards. Subsequent benefits from the US defense acqui-
sition policy change have followed, including marked improvement in cost reduction,
performance, and development times of microelectronic elements of defence systems.
65. Interview with Abe C. Lin, Director General, Integrated Assessment Office, Ministry of
National Defense, 27 June 2005, Taipei, Taiwan.
66. Michael C. Maher, “Can COTS Products Be Used in Radiation Environments?” COTS
Journal (Internet Edition), December 2003, available at http://www.cotsjournal
online.com/home/printthis.php?id=100089, accessed 12 August 2005.
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designer and producer of high-end chips for commercial use
that possess superior functions to those produced by the
defence sector, the civilian side of the industry can surely act
as a COTS supply pool for the military.
However, fieldwork data indicate that at least two factors
may affect whether China-based IC companies sell chips for
Chinese military and aerospace end-use. The first factor
involves the extent of incentives that the relatively small mil-
itary market can offer, while the second element concerns
the ownership of the chip firm in question. 
As for the first factor, the military market has steadily
accounted for less than 5 percent of the global chip end-use
market over the past few decades, despite its initial domi-
nance in the global chip market, and the small quantities of
chips ordered by the military, accompanied by stringent pro-
curement process requirements, have arguably led to the
departure of many chip companies (e.g., Motorola) from the
military market. If these developments in the global chip
market hold true in China, it remains to be seen whether
Chinese military and aerospace end-users will be able to
offer adequate incentives to procure supplies from China-
based commercial chip firms. 
As for the second factor, China’s official electronics industry
yearbooks over the past few years have stated that due to
national security considerations, procurement of dual-use
goods for military end-uses is confined to either wholly state-
owned agencies or civilian firms with at least 50 percent gov-
ernment ownership. If this rule still holds today, we can infer
that joint ventures with foreign input (such as top manageri-
al and engineering manpower) must have at least 50 percent
government ownership in order to qualify for Chinese mili-
tary procurement contracts.
Finally, the dual-use nature of the semiconductor technology
also means that items of certain semiconductor equipment
can be used to make chips for both civilian and military end-
uses. For instance, in the United States, the “national secu-
rity” significance of plasma dry etching equipment has been
identified. (67) In addition, Taiwan is identified as one of the
primary supplier countries for epitaxial silicon wafers, which
are deemed of national security significance because they
are “potential starting materials” for certain semiconductor
devices. (68) This is why the Pentagon has requested that
Taiwan tighten its export controls to ensure that chip equip-
ment re-exported to China will not be used to fabricate chips
for military end-use. Interviews in the US and Taiwan have
confirmed security concerns shared by both countries in this
regard. However, Stanley T. Myers, CEO of SEMI, added
a key qualification to such a possibility: “It’s not a pure play.
You can use older generation equipment to make very
sophisticated products. However, the cost to do that is very
high…But in general, if you’re gonna make them economical
and reliable, you need the newer, the new generation equip-
ment.” (69)
The second major dimension of technology-related defence
risks involves the issue of foreign supply of critical chips to
defence and major infrastructure systems.
The fear of dependence on foreign suppliers for IC compo-
nents critical to US defence and infrastructure systems is not
new, as demonstrated by fierce debates in the United States
in the context of the rise of the Japanese semiconductor
industry in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. But globali-
sation of the chip industry has certainly rekindled the secu-
rity concerns involved.
For the US, the DSB task force study has argued that “trust-
worthiness and supply assurance for components used in crit-
ical military and infrastructure applications are casualties” of
the migration of the chip manufacturing capabilities away
from the US to potential adversaries. (70) Taiwan has
arguably become a part of the globalised defence industrial
base that the US defence establishment can exploit for
foundry services to the Pentagon and its contractors and sub-
contractors. (71) As such, the migration of Taiwan’s foundry
capabilities to China may entail chip supply risks similar to
those that raised the DSB’s concerns over chip manufactur-
ing capabilities moving away from the US.
In particular, the DSB study has identified several scenarios
in which IC parts compromises might make core US
defence capabilities vulnerable to enemy attack at critical
times. First, potential adversaries can play “dirty tricks”
when fabricating critical non-COTS ICs for US demand on
their soil. Such tricks could include the insertion of “Trojan
horses” or other unauthorised design inclusions in unclassi-
fied chips used in military applications. These “contaminat-
ed” items could subsequently act as “time bombs” to dimin-
ish the function of the chips in critical defence equipment.
“Such backdoor features could be used by an adversary to
disrupt military systems at critical times,” warned the report.
Second, the security of classified information embedded in
chip designs might be compromised by the shift from a US
to foreign IC manufacturer. Third, although the use of
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67. General Accounting Office, Export Controls, op. cit., p. 39.
68. Ibid., p. 39.
69. Interview, 10 December 2004, San Jose, California. 
70. Defense Science Board Task Force, High Performance Microchip Supply, op. cit., p. 3.
71. Ibid., p. 24; various interviews with Taiwanese industry players, August and September
2005, Beijing, China and Taipei, Taiwan.
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COTS implies less risk insofar as the destination of COTS
in the US defence systems can be kept anonymous, “even
use of COTS components may not offer full protection from
parts compromise.” 
The above three vulnerability scenarios are compounded by
two realities, one technological and the other related to the
hierarchical nature of the US defence chip acquisition
process. On the technological front, the DSB document has
contended that “neither extensive electrical testing nor
reverse engineering is capable of reliably detecting compro-
mised microelectronics components.” At the acquisition
front, the problem stems from the fact that the Pentagon
does not acquire components at the IC level; instead, it is
often the designers of subsystems who specify individual cir-
cuits, and even system primes have limited knowledge of the
sources of the chips used in their systems. (72)
To assess the extent to which these IC parts compromise
scenarios might damage US technological and defence secu-
rity, let us turn to relevant fieldwork data analysed so far,
which partly substantiate the DSB arguments and partly
challenge its claims.
Some defence experts as well as industry players envisage
the likelihood of these scenarios against the backdrop of
China becoming an increasingly attractive destination for
shifting semiconductor capabilities, and at the same time as
a perceived strategic rival of the US. Joe Chen (Chen Yu-
wu), former President of the military-run Chung-Shan
Institute of Science and Technology in Taiwan, assessed the
likelihood of the insertion of backdoor features: “This is
absolutely possible. It falls into the information warfare
arena.” (73) A Taiwanese chip design house vice president
also did not rule out the possibility of China creating IC
parts compromises, citing what he sees as China’s antago-
nism towards the US as the major motivation. (74)
In contrast, an engineer with military IC design experience
in the US qualified the DSB argument by evaluating the
probability of China inserting backdoor features as an infor-
mation warfare tactic. In his own word, “It is possible, but it
is extremely improbable. It’s extremely hard to do. China is
still far from being able to do it. The CIA or FBI surely will
play such a trick, but the intelligence organisations in China
have no energy for such a task. But this doesn’t mean that
the Chinese won’t do it in 20 years.” (75)
The US is not the only country facing these grave scenarios.
Given the fact that Taiwan relies on the US for its main
weapons systems and military IC supplies, Taiwan can face
similar security risks if chips needed for its defence and
major infrastructure systems are made in China as a result of
the US shifting its chip manufacturing capabilities to China.
In addition, since Taiwan’s IC industry supplies the military
at home (however limited in scale), parts compromises could
also occur as a result of the migration of Taiwan’s own
foundry operations to China.
Aside from the IC parts compromise risks described above,
dependence on ICs fabricated on foreign soil for US
defence applications also exposes the US to other security
risks, such as disruption of supply due to war or natural dis-
aster in the supplier country. A major conflict across the
Taiwan Straits or a massive tremor in Taiwan, which offers
fabrication services for the Pentagon and its contractors,
could cause similar disruption of IC supplies to the global
chip market. Likewise, Taiwan could be affected by IC sup-
ply disruption or blockade if chips needed for its defence
and major infrastructure systems eventually depend in part
or in whole on fabrication services in China.
As chip capacity shifts to potential adversary countries, the
DSB study has also expressed fears that the countries in
question could impose a government-led “reverse-ITAR”
pressure on the US by denying the US access to critical chip
technologies. Just as Japan denied sales of advanced chip
manufacturing tools to the US in the late 1980s, potential
adversary countries where advanced foundry services are
currently building up momentum could refuse to offer
foundry services to the US (and arguably to Taiwan) in the
future. (76)
Finally, if one assumes that leading-edge R&D tends to fol-
low the migration of manufacturing, the current shift of chip
manufacturing capability to potential adversary countries
could trigger a similar migration of related R&D. Close
cooperation between talented IC manufacturing process
engineers and designers underpins successful leading-edge
chip development. The loss of process engineers to countries
where advanced manufacturing dominates, followed by a
possible shift to the same destinations by IC designers,
could thus threaten US leadership in advanced chip tech-
nologies. This, in turn, would affect both commercial and
defence product development processes. (77) A former
Pentagon official did not rule out this risk scenario. (78)
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Faced with foreseeable defence concerns, the US govern-
ment has adopted measures to mitigate these risks and
ensure trustworthy sources of critical chip supplies. In partic-
ular, the US government has signed a deal to use IBM’s
“Trusted Foundry” service in Vermont to ensure the supply
of leading-edge custom circuits at home. However, some
American chip industry and defence sector interviewees
argue that it remains unclear whether the Vermont facility
alone can address all the major security challenges the US
may face with the continued shift of US and Taiwanese chip
manufacturing capabilities to China. (79)
Concerns r e info rced by  Chineseinst itutional  re forms  and perceptions
Concerns over industrial base and technology-related secu-
rity risks are further reinforced by pertinent institutional
reforms in China, and China’s perception of the chip’s
importance to its industrial base, military modernisation,
and modern electronic warfare.
First of all, State Council directives and General
Armaments Department and COSTIND regulations in
2005 triggered a major institutional change in China’s
defence-civilian sector relations. On 28 May 2005, the
Chinese government announced that it would be issuing
new licenses for weapons development and production, and
that some would be given to civilian firms. This opened up
opportunities for civilian firms to participate in the defence
sector, and formally smoothed the channel for transferring
resources from the civilian sector to the defence sector. (80)
This institutional change in China, echoing the global trend
of enhancing the use of COTS items in defence systems,
has arguably reinforced the security concerns outlined
above. Unquestionably, the policy change exemplifies the
core concept in Deng Xiaoping’s “16 Character Policy” that
has guided the Chinese military for the past few decades;
that is, the need to use civilian profits and resources to main-
tain the military (yimin yangjun), and integrate the military
and civilian sectors (junmin jiehe). The timing of the new
institutional reform reflects Beijing’s determination to sys-
temically absorb resources from the private sector in a fast-
growing industrial base to directly benefit the defence sector,
and mirrors official attempts to maximise the national tech-
nological base upon which China can modernise its military
infrastructure by integrating the civilian and the non-civilian
sectors. The change also indicates Beijing’s recognition of
the dual-use and multi-use nature of most technologies,
including semiconductor technologies. 
None of the interviewed China-based chip firms that were
managed or owned by Taiwanese said that they had sup-
plied chips to the Chinese military and aerospace indus-
tries. However, the institutional reform may subject China-
based firms with Taiwanese input to strong incentives or
coercion to sell suitable ICs to the Chinese defence indus-
trial complex, as long as their Taiwan link is not considered
an obstacle in the eyes of the Chinese defence establish-
ment. (81)
Running parallel to China’s institutional change is the
Chinese perception of the semiconductor’s importance to
the nation’s industrial base, military modernisation, and
modern electronic warfare. This perception arguably
strengthens the state-led resolve to build a solid chip indus-
try with both economic and strategic objectives in mind,
thus further reinforcing the afore-mentioned defence-related
security risks faced by the US and Taiwan.
Yu Zhongyu, President of CSIA, said the development of
the semiconductor in China is not limited to science and
technology considerations: “Not merely to science, the
semiconductor industry is also a very important industry to
economic development and defence security.” (82)
Microelectronics is also on a list of enabling technologies
recognised by the Chinese defence industrial complex as
critical to the PLA modernisation process. In 1993, for
instance, the Chinese space and missile industry formed a
research academy dedicated to the development of space-
qualified microelectronics. (83) The notion of “chipping” as
part of the modern electronic warfare scenario is not foreign
in PLA writings. Secondary materials show that the
Chinese military is aware of the previous US tactic of using
backdoor devices in IC components in its war strategies,
while advocating similar measures in future warfare. (84)
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Concerns r e inforced  by the  Taiwan factor
The afore-mentioned security ramifications can be further
complicated by the Taiwanese chip industry’s migration to
China because of the following factors:
First, language and cultural proximity, as well as the “great
China complex” in the minds of some Taiwanese semicon-
ductor professionals working in China, can facilitate informal
and formal know-how transfers and flows between veteran
Taiwanese industry players and their Chinese counterparts.
In a sector characterised by “learning by doing,” language
and cultural proximity helps accelerate the speed and effi-
ciency of knowledge transfer. It is exactly in this respect that
input from Taiwan plays a distinctive role in helping China
catch up in the global IC race with their counterparts from
Europe, Japan, and the US. First-hand interviews strongly
support this argument. (85) For example, the so-called “great
China complex,” an aspiration to contribute to the building
of a stronger China, is affirmed by Taiwanese American
David Wang (Wang Ning-kuo), a former senior vice presi-
dent at Applied Materials who shifted to Shanghai to work
as CEO of Huahong (Huahong) group in 2005. (86) These
intangible factors may join to accelerate the formation of a
solid chip industrial base in China in due course.
Secondly, continuous political tensions across the Straits
have functioned as a structural constraint that prevents any
official Taiwanese presence in China, and make it impossi-
ble for Taipei to implement its relevant policies. For
instance, how can the Taiwanese government determine that
equipment is shipped to China purely for civilian use with-
out on-site inspections? Doubts have been cast on the effec-
tiveness of the US government’s on-site inspections of
China-based chip firms in an attempt to ensure that no mil-
itary end-use is serviced by these firms, (87) even though these
inspections are legally endorsed by Beijing and Washington.
The lack of such an inspection by Taiwanese officials in
China makes any unilateral policy in Taipei void. The inabil-
ity to effectively implement the Taiwanese policy naturally
presents a serious pitfall to official regulations, which can be
circumvented by private sector actors who wish to avoid
exorbitant punitive costs. 
Thirdly, the matter is further complicated by political infight-
ing and bureaucratic inefficiency in Taiwan. A draft bill pro-
posed by the government to prevent the flow of Taiwan’s
sensitive high technologies and creative talent to mainland
China has been buried in legislative committee proceedings
for numerous parliamentary sessions. The US defence
establishment and academics failed to anticipate this domes-
tic political dimension, however, (88) with some predicting
that the bill would sail through the legislature with ease. (89)
“Our current difficulty is that the bill is yet to sail through
the legislature,” admitted Wu Maw-kuen (Wu Maw-kuen),
the then Minister of Taiwan’s National Science Council. (90)
At a time when Washington is proposing new policies to
enhance civilian trade with China while preventing sensitive
exports to the Chinese military amid protest from Beijing,
Taiwan has yet to pass its own much less comprehensive
bill. (91) As a result, Taiwan could become the weakest link in
any attempt to curb transfers of advanced dual-use chip tech-
nologies with potential military significance and much-need-
ed investment to China.
Fourthly, although the Taiwanese chip sector largely designs
and produces chips for civilian end-use, Taiwan’s strong IC
design and manufacturing capabilities have the potential to
cater to the needs of the defence sector. Fieldwork research
has discovered that some Taiwan firms have offered foundry
services to the Pentagon, its contractors, and subcontractors,
as well as Taiwan’s defence establishment, although the
business accounts for only a small part of the companies’ rev-
enues. Taiwan’s foundry and design services could just as
easily be made available to defence sectors elsewhere,
including China. (92)
In sum, a semiconductor industry is a building block for a
strong defence, although other factors such as system inte-
gration and software capability are equally, if not more,
important to a nation’s defence capability enhancement.
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Glossary
Zhongxin 中芯
Chang Ju-ching 張汝京
Tsai Nan-Hsiung 蔡南雄
Hongli 宏力
Zhongwei 中緯
Taijidian 台積電
Liandian 聯電
Lijin 力晶
Maode 茂德
Huarun shanghua 華潤上華
Hejian 和艦
Tseng Fan-cheng 曾繁城
Chen Shuibian 陳水扁
Chen Yu-wu 陳友武
Wang Ning-kuo 王寧國
Huahong 華虹
Wu Maw-kuen 吳茂昆
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The migration of the Taiwanese chip industry to China, like
the shift of the US chip manufacturing base from the US,
can help accelerate China’s leap in the global chip race.
Given the chip industry’s importance to a nation’s defence
and economic clout, countries that have uneasy political and
defence relations with China, but which are driven by eco-
nomic forces to help China catch up in the chip race, natu-
rally face enormous security risks. Taiwan and the US are
the countries most affected by the latest dynamic in the glob-
al chip industry, which has shifted the spotlight to China,
the ambitious latecomer.Conclusion
To sum up, the empirical case study shows that in an age of
globalisation, economic forces can be so compelling as to
limit or thwart any attempts by state actors to curb cross-bor-
der economic movements led by firms or individuals, even in
the name of security. The dilemma faced by the Taiwanese
state facing a powerful chip industry’s resolve to move into
China seems to support the “state in retreat” school of
thought in globalisation-related literature. The challenges
faced by the US government tell a similar story, if to a less-
er extent. 
This study further demonstrates how a broad-based multidis-
ciplinary approach to security studies can bring about a con-
textually rich discussion of the linkage between security and
globalisation. The chip industry migration across the Straits
entails potential security risks for the countries involved, but
we may be blind to the full complexity of these risks without
a sectoral-based multidisciplinary analysis. Beyond war, glob-
al security encompasses other important areas — such as
technological aspects of security and economically driven
security challenges — in which substantial empirical research
is needed to advance our understanding of the volatile con-
temporary world. For that reason, it may be time to embrace
a widener’s approach to the study of security. •
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